The Old Contemptibles Page 2

  Sadowa ended the Confederation of the Rhine and replaced it with a North German Federation dominated by Prussia. In effect, Prussia had now annexed Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse, Frankfurt and Nassau. The next step was to take over the south German states, Bavaria, Wurtenburg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. This takeover plan excluded Austria, the most populous German state, partly because Prussia wanted no rivals to her new-found dominant status, mainly because the Austro-Hungarian Empire contained a preponderance of Slavs. The Prussians were very intent on excluding non-Germans from their new creation; even in the 1860s racism was a factor in German politics.

  The architect of this grand design was Bismarck and the catalyst for his next step, the takeover of the southern German states and their incorporation into a united Germany - the German Empire of the first Kaiser- was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 -71. This war was engineered entirely by Bismarck, notably by redrafting the notorious 'Ems Telegram', a missive from Napoleon III, and turn­ ing it from a conciliatory message into a cause for war.

  War between Prussia and France began on I9 July 1870 and was over by 28 January 1871. Defeat cost France a colossal sum in reparations and the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine - and ended the reign of Napoleon III. From now on France would be a republic - the Third Republic - fired with the desire for revanche - revenge - against Prussia and a determination to reclaim these stolen provinces from the grasp of a united Germany- the southern German kingdoms and duchies now having also joined the Kaiser's Empire.

  These events and their outcome, three major wars in six years propelling Prussia to mastery of a united Germany containing over 60 million people, were watched with alarm by the other nations of Europe. If force was to be the arbiter of European affairs, how could Germany be resisted? The obvious answer was the old one; a series of international treaties binding the smaller nations together to resist such aggression if or when it came.

  In fact, fears of further German expansion were at first groundless. Bismarck had no wish to extend the territorial grasp of the German Empire in Europe or any interest in the acquisition of colonies overseas. After 1871 he devoted his life to consolidating those territories already gained and making Germany a great power through expansion of technical education and a move towards industrialization. In this he was extremely successful, but Bismarck also found it necessary to protect his new creation with a network of alliances, knowing that, sooner or later, the French would try to retake Alsace and Lorraine.

  In 1872 Bismarck linked Germany with Austria-Hungary and Russia in the 'League of the Three Emperors' - the Dreikaiserbund. This proved a fragile alliance. Austria-Hungary and Russia were soon in dispute over the Balkans, where the Austrians hoped for territorial gains when the Ottoman Empire finally collapsed, while Russia saw itself as the protector of the Balkan Slavs, most notably the Serbs. Therefore, in 1879, Bismarck set up another alliance - the Dual Alliance - with Austria­ Hungary. In 1882 Italy joined to form the Triple Alliance, which envisaged Russia as a potential enemy. However, to keep his options open, in 1887 Bismarck also signed a 'Reinsurance Treaty' with Russia. By the time he was forced out of office by Wilhelm II in 1890, Bismarck believed that he had constructed a firm basis for German security. This security was not to last. The other European leaders had eventually recognized Bismarck as a stabilizing force; now he had gone, who knew what might happen?

  The third Hohenzollern Kaiser, Wilhelm II, a grandson of Queen Victoria, came to the Imperial throne in July 1888, aged twenty-nine. Having dismissed Bismarck, the Kaiser revoked the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and proceeded to upset the fragile stability of Europe with a series of sabre-rattling declarations. The surrounding nations thereupon took appropriate steps to protect themselves against potential aggression, and in 1891 France formed an alliance with Tsarist Russia. This led to the Franco-Russian Pact of 1893, in which each nation promised to aid the other if attacked. The pact stated quite openly that the poten­ tial aggressor was Imperial Germany.

  The problem for the smaller nations of Europe, and even for a half-European, half-Asian power like Russia, was not simply that the Kaiser was unpredictable. Imperial Germany also had a vast army and industrial muscle. Germany was now the leading industrial nation in Europe, and some sectors of industry, most notably Krupp of Essen, were devoting themselves to the manufacture of modern weapons for an army that could muster, at any one time, around half a million men. This already vast force could be rapidly expanded by the recall of trained reservists, and could have no other purpose but to overawe neighbouring states. In terms of location, population, industrial capacity and military strength, Germany was a force that had to be reckoned with, for if the German Emperor opted for territorial conquest he had the means to carry it out. Given the right catalyst, European peace might easily collapse into war.

  The catalyst was Kaiser Wilhelm II himself. From the moment of his accession his behaviour increased the strains in Europe and set the continent on the road to war. His arrogance, his pleasure in military power, his suspicion of France, his contempt for Russia, his jealousy of Britain- especially the Royal Navy and his detested uncle, Edward VII - his threats, his interference in the affairs of other nations, combined to create a chronic instability in Europe. To give just one example of the Kaiser's behaviour, consider the following rant to his host, Leopold, King of the Belgians, during a visit to Brussels in 1904: 'I told him I could not be played with. In the case of a European war, whoever was not for me was against me. As a soldier I belonged to the school of Frederick the Great, to the school of Napoleon. As the Seven Years War began with the invasion of Saxony, and the latter had always, with lightning speed, forestalled his enemies, so should I, in the event of Belgium not being on my side, be actuated by strategical considerations only.'

  Psychiatrists allege that arrogant behaviour often stems from a sense of inferiority. The Kaiser's actions seem to have been fuelled by a belief that Germany had been hard done by, that her obvious worth had not been fully appreciated by the other nations of Europe. 'German kultur in German eyes was the heir of Greece and Rome and they themselves were the best educated and most cultivated of modern peoples, yet foreigners in their appreciation of this fact fell curiously short of perfect understanding,' wrote Barbara Tuchman. (2) 'Paris remained Europe's centre of art, pleasure and fashion, London of Society, Rome of antiquity and Italy the lure of travellers seeking sun and beauty.'

  Nor was this all. Bismarck's desire to build the German empire from within had left Germany out of the late-nineteenth-century 'Scramble for Africa' and the subsequent acquisition of overseas colonies- it lacked what Wilhelm's Chancellor, Prince von Bulow, came to call 'a place in the sun'. The Germans were not content with economic dominance of Europe and ,the long-term benefits in political terms that must accrue to their growing industrial base. They wanted recognition of their worth as a people. They forgot that other nations also had interests that they would not willingly cede to German pressure or the Kaiser's ambitions.

  The Kaiser inherited the Alsace-Lorraine problem along with his throne but he further upset France in 1905 by his interference at Tangier in Morocco, and did it again with the 'Agadir Incident'­ again in Morocco - in July 1911, when the German gunboat Panther was dispatched to this Moroccan port in an attempt to intervene in French affairs. The British - following the Entente Cordiale of 1904- supported France over the Tangier and Agadir incidents - by now the British also had long-standing problems with the Kaiser.

  At the time the Kaiser's actions and attitudes could not be ignored or treated with the amused contempt they might now seem to deserve. Even those who regarded Kaiser Wilhelm as an arrogant blowhard had to face the fact that Germany was the major military and industrial power in Europe and, on the evidence of the recent past, one more than willing to employ force to get what it wanted. From 1900, the result was an escalating, European-wide arms race, each nation striving to protect itself from a situation it had played some part in creating- though the ma
jor player in this dangerous game was the Kaiser.

  Smaller countries such as France clearly needed allies. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the populations of most European countries soared- Germany's rose by 10 per cent to 66 million - but for some reason, and in spite of state subsidies for mothers of large families, the population of France failed to expand; by 1914 it stood at only 37 million. Demographics alone dictated a bilateral defence treaty with another power, but the Franco-Russian Pact of 1891, which expanded to a full alliance in 1894, was regarded by the Kaiser as 'encirclement', a deliberate threat to the security of Germany and an excuse for further sabre­ rattling.

  The Imperial General Staff agreed with the Kaiser. Since 1871 they had been convinced that the French would one day attempt to take back Alsace and Lorraine. Now it appeared likely that when the French made their attempt their Russian allies would attack from the east. So the prospect of war grew - and tension increased in Britain from 1911 when the Germans began to widen and deepen the Kiel Canal, so threatening Britain's eastern coast and communications with the continent.

  British attempts to stop an escalation in warship construction by mutual agreement were rejected by the Germans in 1912, so the British also began to modernize their fleet and look for allies. They came to an agreement with France whereby the French took charge of naval security in the Mediterranean and the British Navy guaranteed the security of the French Channel ports and the Channel entrance from the North Sea. The Kaiser, inevitably, saw this agreement as another threat to Germany.

  There is some basis for this belief; nations are not altruistic and Britain's wariness about Germany's long-term ambitions provided a far stronger motive than any desire to help the French. Britain could never let a potentially hostile power such as Germany gain possession of ports on the Channel coast, close to her shores. Britain's interest in Belgian neutrality had the same strategic roots - the Germans must not gain possession of the Belgian ports.

  In fact, Belgian neutrality was already under threat. The Imperial German Staff were preparing a war plan to combat the perceived problems of encirclement - war on two fronts - caused by the Franco-Russian alliance. This plan had been prepared by Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German Imperial Staff from 1891 to 1906. Von Schlieffen was sure that Germany would eventually have to fight a war in the west against France and another in the east against Russia; it would therefore be caught in a vice and could not survive.

  Von Schlieffen's answer to this problem was a first-strike plan ­ the Schlieffen Plan - based on the geographical fact that, thanks to a central position in Europe and her modern railway network, Germany possessed the strategic benefit known in military circles as the 'advantage of interior lines'- the ability to shift forces rapidly from one front to another. Further strategic advantages lay in the sheer size of Russia, the inefficiency of the Russian Army and the inadequacies of Russia's railway system. Russian mobilization must inevitably take time and it would be weeks - von Schlieffen thought six weeks- before the Russian armies could endanger the frontiers of the Reich. In that time span he saw an opportunity - and two snags.

  It would be possible, von Schlieffen argued, for Germany to fall on France in great force and defeat her before the vast but obsolescent Russian Army could move. Then the full might of the German Army could be rushed east by rail to win a second victory over the Slavic hordes. Clearly, this dual campaign would not be easy but, given the size of the German Army and the professional skill of the Imperial Staff, it was feasible. The plan took years to develop but it stood up to critical examination and the facilities needed to make it work- the roads, the railways, the sidings- and, above all, the logistical aids and marching qualities of German soldiers -were all developed during this time.

  The Schlieffen Plan required that while some German forces repelled any French invasion from the west into Alsace-Lorraine and across the Rhine, and opposed any Russian build-up in the east, the bulk of the German Army - consisting in fact of five armies - should be massed in the west, on the right wing, and sweep into France from the north-east- through Luxembourg and Belgium. Once across the Franco-Belgian frontier, these armies would move west of Paris and swing to the east, south of the city, isolating the French capital and catching the French forces in the rear, hustling them against the fixed defences along the Franco­German border. This strategy would require great speed and mobility - and the violation of Belgian neutrality.

  The first snag in the Schlieffen Plan was that speed and mobility were not adequately available in the horse-powered armies of 1914. The second was that invading Belgium would probably bring Great Britain and her empire into the war. This was something the Germans were fully aware of and most anxious to avoid, but a move through Belgium was the only way to bypass the fixed French defences on their common frontier and gain the necessary time.

  The Schlieffen Plan passed through various drafts but was finally adopted in 1905. The French also had a plan, Plan XVII, which will be discussed later, but understanding the Schlieffen Plan is crucial, for it escalated progress towards war- and ensured British involvement. The crucial element in the plan was time, and there was not enough of it. Germany must mobilize quickly and strike first in order to defeat France completely in just six weeks, before the Russian armies could take the field. This time factor introduced a political dimension, for if Russia or France mobilized or started to mobilize Germany must declare war - waiting for arbitration or intervention from any quarter, say Britain or the USA, would eat into that precious, limited amount of time. Mobilization, in short, was not a step towards war or a precautionary gesture- in 1914 mobilization was war.

  The broad details of the Schlieffen Plan were soon known abroad, and the details came out in 1909 when von Schlieffen, now retired, published an article in the Deutsche Revue magazine, criticizing his successor, General Helmuth von Moltke, the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff, for reducing the forces committed to the right wing. Von Schlieffen died in 1912; his last words were, allegedly, 'Remember, keep the right wing strong.'

  Von Moltke did not heed this advice. He felt that Germany could execute the Schlieffen Plan - given a few amendments - declaring in 1912, when army ranks were full and work on the Kiel Canal was almost complete, that 'War is inevitable, and the sooner the better.' Von Moltke then became worried that the eastern frontier was not fully secure. Therefore, while it is hardly fair to say that he weakened the right wing, it is true to say that he did not increase the forces destined to invade Belgium and France, preferring to devote more divisions to the east. Essentially, however, the Schlieffen Plan, Germany's once-and-for-all bid to win the war in six weeks and prevent the disaster of a conflict on two fronts, was still in place in August 1914.

  So much for Germany. What of the Kaiser's principal European ally, the Austro-Hungarian Empire? The empire, a union resulting from the Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867, when Hungary broke away and became a separate kingdom under the imperial crown, was already starting to crumble, though the major splits had yet to appear. Austria-Hungary in 1914 was that post-1920 ideal, the multiracial state, one where a great number of races lived in apparent harmony. The roots of internal conflict for the Austro­ Hungarians lay in the Balkans, most notably in Serbia.

  Serbia was an independent Balkan state, outside Austro­ Hungarian hegemony, but a large number of ethnic Serbs lived in the newly annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary had taken over in 1908. These 'ethnic Serbs' wished to join these provinces with Serbia to create a 'Greater Serbia', and were pressing their case with demonstrations and acts of terrorism inside Austria-Hungary. A further complication was that Tsarist Russia, which regarded itself as the protector of Slav interests, had offered guarantees of support to Serbia in the event of Austro-Hungarian intervention. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, had no intention of relinquishing the annexed territories - the Empire could not survive if parts of it were allowed to break away at will.

  T
his, in broad outline, is the European powder keg of 1914. Examine the situation of all the major powers and the same scen­ ario prevails- rising tensions and problems increased rather than reduced by an interlocking series of alliances which, if invoked, must surely escalate any local issue into a major European war. All it needed was a spark to touch off the powder.

  That spark was provided on 28 June 1914, when a Serbian stu­ dent, Gavrilo Princep, shot the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Austro-Hungarian heir, during a state visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. From the moment the archduke and his wife fell dead, that long-established interlocking network of continental alliances was duly invoked and Europe began its rapid descent into war.

  If Austria-Hungary had simply invaded Serbia the day after the assassination, when the shock waves from these murders were still reverberating around the chancelleries and palaces of Europe and there was a great deal of sympathy for the Austrian position, it is arguable at least that the conflict would never have spread outside the Balkans. However, weeks were to pass before any military action was taken, time for each side to muster their allies and broaden the base of the war but not, apparently, to consider exactly what sort of war it might be - a 'total war' - or to find ways to prevent it.

  No one, least of all the Kaiser, really wanted war. Now that prospect was starkly before them, the impetus to war was spurred by a general feeling that a brief European war might clear the air, resolve issues and offer a fresh start. Nor was the prospect of war unwelcome to the electorates. In Berlin and Paris, Moscow and Vienna, even in London, crowds singing patriotic tunes took to the streets, cheering the arrival of a long-expected event, glad that the waiting was over.

  Immediately after the assassination, Austria-Hungary demanded that Serbia hunt down and punish the assassins. This was understandable but the demands were made in a language that no independent nation could accept - which was their entire purpose. Austria-Hungary was set on war and needed a Serbian rejection of these demands in order to justify it.